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THE 1943 REVENUE BILL
RANDOLPH E. PAUL*
I am more than glad to be in Indianapolis tonight. Apart
from the honor conferred in an invitation from the Indiana
State Bar Association, the capital of this State brings special
recollections to me. It was the scene of early labors on tax
books published by the Bobbs-Merrill Company. Those were
the happy days when two years elapsed between revenue
acts, and tax law did not change before printer's ink was dry.
We worked day and night here in the Claypool Hotel feeding
manuscript to our insatiable publisher. Little did I think
then that I should return to Indianapolis many years later to
close the circle by appearing before this gathering as a spe-
cialist in tax matters.
I should like to talk to you tonight not just as a specialist,
but also as a fellow-citizen. Specialists have a way of speak-
ing evasively in $2 words and in long dreary paragraphs.
The charge has been made, sometimes with justification, that
they have a vested interest in keeping their subject mys-
terious so that their special skill will not lose its market
value. I want to talk frankly and directly in 10-cent words.
You Hoosiers have a reputation for being able to take straight
talk. I am counting on you to live up to that reputation to-
night.
To begin with, I want to say unequivocally that the Rev-
enue Bill of 1943, as it is about to be debated on the Senate
floor, is a tragic failure. It fails to meet the three principal
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tests of a wartime revenue measure. First, it does not raise
enough revenue. Second, it fails as an instrument to reduce
inflationary pressure. Third, it denies to more than 50 mil-
lion taxpayers the simplification of tax law to which they
are entitled. And, finally, it makes renegotiation unworkable
and ineffective as a means of controlling profits on war con-
tracts.
THE REVENUE TEST
We may as well face the facts at the outset. With war
expenditures of $92 billion in the current (1944) fiscal year,
a total reduced budget of $98 billion, and a revenue yield from
existing taxes of $41 billion, we are running a deficit of $57
billion. In November, 1943, the Federal Government spent
$5.7 billion more than it collected in revenue. We were ac-
cumulating debt at the rate of nearly $200 million a day.
At the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1944, this means a
debt of about $200 billion, on which the interest charges will
be close to $4 billion a year.
There is no escape from these expenditures. They are
war expenditures. They provide weapons for our fighting
forces. If we could, we would spend more; if we had no
increased revenue possibilities, we would still spend to win
the war as completely and as quickly as possible.
But the very emergency which makes us spend provides
the stuff of debt avoidance. In 1933 citizens had cash in-
come after taxes of $44 billion; in the glorious year 1929,
they had $80 billion. In the current fiscal year 1944 they
will have $126 billion, far above the prosperity we thought we
had in the peak year of the Twenties. The way out of debt
accumulation is plain to nearly every eye.
It was plain to the Treasury on October 4, 1943, when
the Secretary of the Treasury proposed to the House Ways
and Means Committee an additional tax' program of $10.5
billion which he described on November 29th as "needed to
safeguard the financial and economic future of this country
during and after the war."
This program might have been criticized as inadequate,
but it could hardly be fairly condemned as too drastic. We
faced a period in which consumer income after taxes, $126
billion, exceeded by $36 billion the amount required to buy
the $90 billion of available consumer goods and services at
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present prices. Our people would have $36 billion which
would not be spent. The $10.5 billion program would have
appropriated to government use in wartime-in the most
critical period in our history-less than one-third of the ex-
cess. It would have permitted us to save over 5 times as
much as the $5 billion we were able to save in liquid forms
in 1940, the highest amount ever saved in any year in the
pre-war decade.
Our people are financially prosperous. In the period
from January 1, 1940, to June 30, 1943, they accumulated
$55 billion of savings, after paying increased taxes. In 1943
they spent nearly twice as much for clothing as in 1939. They
spent more than twice as much on restaurant meals and
drinks. They spent nearly three times as much on jewelry.
I do not mean to imply that every American is living in a
paradise of silk shirts, juicy steaks, and corona-coronas,
though I cannot help recalling the aphorism of your distin-
guished neighbor who said: "What this country needs is a
good five-cent cigar."
With all this spending the American people have saved
more than ever before. They have accumulated in the last
31/2 years liquid savings of more than $55 billion of which
fully half is in increased currency and bank accounts. Is it not
clear that they could afford to pay $10.5 billion of additional
taxes? I, for one, believe they would have been willing, if
not glad, to do so.
If I am right, little need be said about the bill soon to be
debated in the Senate. As it passed the House, it was ex-
pected to raise $2.1 billion in a full year of operation. The
cancellation of the automatic rise in Social Security taxes will
reduce prospective receipts by $1.4 billion. That means that
the Senate bill will raise only $876 million. This is without
allowance, however, for revenue losses and increases in ex-
penditures resulting from the Finance Committee renegotia-
tion amendments which open the door to war profiteering.
If these amendments stand, it will be years before we know
precise financial effects; but it is possible that they will put
the bill in the red. In short, what started out to be a revenue
bill is now in large part a measure to appropriate public funds
for "relief" of war profiteers and others.
I wonder what returning soldiers and sailors and marines
will think of this tax measure-a statute passed by the people
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at home which says: We did not want to surrender to the
Government a third of our war-made prosperity while you
were fighting the enemy in mountain, jungle, desert and on
the sea. We preferred to pass on the load to the future
when you who fought would also be required to pay.
INFLATION TEST
One might understand a refusal to be taxed, if it meant
more purchasing power in the pockets and bank accounts of
taxpayers. Against the big loss of participation in the war
effort there would be the small, immediate gain of increased
wealth. From a narrow, selfish viewpoint such an attitude
might make sense. But the grim fact is that as a people
we gain nothing by refusing to pay taxes. On the contrary,
we stand to lose a great deal. Inflation very well may take
what we do not pay to the tax collector. And more.
I some times suspect that many of us are passive about
inflation because we have heard so much about it. For two
years the economists have been warning us that inflation
would soon engulf us, yet so far we are only knee-deep in it.
We forgot that it has stayed within bounds because of the
steps we have taken to prevent rising prices. The danger
is that we are emotionilly weary of hearing the word "infla-
tion" at the very time it is most threatening. You remem-
ber the fable of the shepherd boy who assuaged his loneliness
by crying, "Wolf, Wolf," to the villagers. When the wolf
actually came, he lost his flock because the people refused to
believe him.,
I cannot cover the subject of inflation in a short evening
address. It comes from a sudden and enormous increase of
money among a people without a corresponding increase of
things to buy. It ends in prices that take away the buying
power of savings as well as income. You may have seen
the picture of "Joe's Diner" in Harry Scherman's pamphlet
on inflation. A returning soldier is sitting on a stool in front
of the counter with his hand reaching into his pocket for
money. His uplifted face is directed at a sign to which the
waiter is pointing. The sign lists prices: coffee, 50 cents;
coffee, with cream, 75 cents; hamburger, $1; hamburger, with
french fried potatoes, $1.50. The title of the picture is a
question: "Shall we let him come home to this?"
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He may very well come home to such prices-and we at
home may pay such prices-unless we face the economic facts
that meet every qualified eye. Without reduction, pressure
of abundant income will be too much for our existing price
structure. Price and wage ceilings, and rationing have held
the line fairly well so far. No one knows the ultimate break-
ing point of these direct control devices, but we do know that
they are now threatened. More than ever they need the help
of additional taxes which reduce spending power. If they
do not get this help, and other help that is being asked, our
soldiers and sailors and marines may return to 50 cent cof-
fee and $1 hamburgers.
The arithmetic of inflation is simple. In 1929 consumers
had $11 to spend upon every $10 of goods. In 1940 they had
$11.10; in 1941, $11.80; in 1942, $13.30; in the first half of
1943, $13.80. The rate promises to be about $14 for the
fiscal year 1944 as compared with $11 in 1929. In total
terms the Nation has $126 billion of spending power this
fiscal year-after existing taxes-against $90 billion of avail-
able goods. The excess of $36 billion, plus accumulated sav-
ings of $55 billion, make a total of over $90 billion nervous
dollars, which threaten our price structure with collapse.
Neither the House nor the Senate bill attempts to cope
with this dangerous situation. Any pretense that the bill
will appreciably diminish inflationary pressure is what Jus-
tices Holmes called "little more than a fiction intended to
beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers." A 2 billion
tax bill is hardly a gesture of inflation prevention. It indi-
cates that the Congress either does not see the inflation
clouds on the horizon, or that it does not choose to batten
down the hatches against them.
SIMPLIFICATION TEST
Before examining the new tax bill in the light of its
failure to meet the popular demand for simplification, I shall
confess that I have made two speeches in favor of simplify-
ing our tax laws. In this, my third attempt, I am reminded
of Fit the First in Lewis Carroll's "The Hunting of the
Snark"
* . Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true."
1944]
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I hope that what I shall say may be true of itself and not by
virtue of reiteration. I hope it was true the first time I
said it.
The desirability of simplifying our tax laws is so ob-
vious that I shall not labor it here. One set of figures is
enough. In 1932 exemptions and national income were at
such levels that less than two million returns were filed with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Time and the war will raise
this figure to 44 million for 1944.
In this distinguished group of Indiana attorneys I should
like to draw one item from my personal experience in the
tax field. When I was in your position I was interested in
the problems of the few clients I had. Their problems were
in the field of estate and gift taxes, corporate reorganizations,
valuation, trusts. I was intensely concerned with the com-
plication of our tax laws in this territory. It seemed unjus-
tifiable. I still believe it is intolerable, and I shall leave no
stone unturned in my effort to make these provisions of the
statute simpler and easier for the taxpayers who are most
affected by them to understand. That is a long, uphill job
if we would do it well. As Mr. Justice Jackson said in the
recent Dobson case: "No other branch of the law touches hu-
man activities at so many points. It can never be made sim-
ple, but we can try to avoid making it needlessly complex."
But I must confess to a shift of interest since I have been
with the Treasury Department. Our immediate problem to-
day is simplification for the masses of taxpayers. If the
income tax-the bulwark of our tax system-is to succeed,
we must find a way of making the tax understandable to 50
million taxpayers who cannot employ lawyers and accountants.
We must tackle the job in full realization that these millions
are not concerned with what the statute and the regulations
and the court decisions say. To them the income tax return
and the instructions on that return are the whole story. It
is logical, then, that simplification should begin at that level.
It was at that level that the Treasury began its current
campaign against income tax complexity. A group of legal
and research experts, joined by several specialists in the lay-
man's point of view, gathered around the conference table
last summer to simplify individual income tax returns. They
introduced a number of new features into the returns to be
filed next March, and made some progress in modifying the
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traditional form of the income tax return in the interest of
simplification.
I am frank to predict, however, that taxpayers will not
call the results simple. Time and again the move for sim-
plification has run against a stone wall. The primary ob-
structions this year were the Victory tax and the cancella-
tion feature involved in the transition to a pay-as-you-go
system. Fortunately, the hurdle of cancellation will be be-
hind us when we draft the return forms for 1945.
In this group I need not elaborate upon the complica-
tions of the Victory tax. I need only remind you, first, that
the Victory tax has introduced a separate concept of taxable
income; second, that it uses an exemption different from
the regular income tax exemption; third, that it requires
an entirely separate tax computation; and fourth, that it
recognizes family status only through a complicated credit.
This credit was labeled a postwar credit, but was made avail-
able currently on such easy terms that the word "postwar"
became a misnomer. Congress, recognizing this infirmity,
eliminated the postwar aspects of the credit and made it
simply a current credit. The Treasury recommended this
change and would go even further. It would like to see the
rest of this noble experiment given a decent burial. In con-
templation of its death, the logical move would be to shift
the burden of the Victory tax to the regular income tax
structure. To that end the Treasury has proposed that the
Victory tax be eliminated and that with a reduction of ex-
emptions and dependency credits its burden be absorbed into
the net income tax scale.
The tax bill, as passed by the House, would repeal the
Victory tax, an essential step if we are to achieve simplifi-
cation. However, instead of integrating it with the regular
income tax, it sets up a separate minimum tax. In other
words, it replaces an additional tax with an alternative tax.
If this minimum tax were to become law, the taxpayer would
be confronted with two alternative taxes, each with different
rates and each with an entirely different set of exemptions.
The relationships between the minimum tax and the regular
tax are so complex and elusive that many husbands and wives
would be forced to go through a lengthy series of alterna-
tive computations to determine their lowest possible tax lia-
bility. All in all, the Treasury concluded that the minimum
1944]
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tax "cure" prescribed in the House bill is worse than the
Victory tax "disease."
Fortunately, the defects of the minimum tax plan in the
House bill were so patent that the Senate Finance Commit-
tee refused to accept it. Unfortunately, the Committee was
unwilling to abandon the Victory tax, although it did effect
some simplification by changing its rate to a flat 3 percent
for every taxpayer regardless of marital or dependency status.
You may wonder why the House, with its minimum tax,
and the Senate Finance Committee, with its modified Victory
tax, are straining every legislative muscle to keep a separate
income tax in existence. The crux of the matter is the 9
million taxpayers at the bottom of the tax scale who are now
paying the Victory tax, but would be relieved from any tax
on income under the Treasury proposal. To clear away the
smoke screen with which this issue has been confused, I should
like to explain briefly why the Treasury felt it desirable
to relieve these taxpayers from Federal taxes on income.
The absorption of the Victory tax would not result in a
reduction of the total tax burden of the 9 million taxpayers.
As a consequence of the excise tax increases proposed by the
Treasury, they would pay practically as much under the
Treasury proposals as under present law.
It is important to identify the 9 million taxpayers who
would be relieved of future Federal taxes on income. They
are exclusively heads of families earning less than the ex-
emptions proposed by the Treasury, that is, $1,100 per year
plus $300 for each dependent. The only reason why they are
now taxable is that their income exceeds the flat $624 Vic-
tory tax exemption which applies to every income recipient
regardless of his family obligations.
If the 9 million taxpayers who are the center of the
controversy could be kept on the rolls without undue com-
plexity and if the proportion of their contributions to total
revenue were substantial, some justification could be found
for their retention as income-tax payers. But these condi-
tions simply cannot be met. To extend the regular income
tax downward to encompass these 9 million taxpayers would
subject them to crushing and inequitable burdens. The alter-
native, represented by the Victory tax and substitutes de-
vised by the Congressional tax committees, imposes distress-
ing complexities on 50 million taxpayers without contributing
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substantially to income tax revenues. Even the pretty label
"Victory tax" cannot conceal the unfortunate complexity of
a dual income tax system. The label on the cover cannot
change the nature of the contents-it is a Pandora's box of
troubles no matter what we call it.
Although the Treasury's proposals as a whole would not
sacrifice revenue from the 9 million taxpayers, there would
be a loss in income tax revenue from this group. At present,
the 9 million taxpayers in question are paying about $275
million in Victory taxes. Under the House bill, they would
pay $161 million and under the Senate Finance Committee
version of the bill, they would pay slightly more than $275
million. In other words, to collect less, perhaps much less,
than $300 million from the 9 million taxpayers at the bottom
of the income scale, the 1943 Revenue Bill would complicate
the collection of $17 billion from 50 million taxpayers through-
out the scale. I repeat what I stated to the Senate Finance
Committee several weeks ago in analyzing the House bill:
"It seems utterly unreasonable to erect a mountain of com-
plexity for such a molehill of revenue."
RENEGOTIATION
Believe it or not, I have yet to reach the worst feature
of the 1943 Revenue Bill. I have protested that the bill does
not raise sufficient revenue. I have declared that it almost
completely ignores the threat of inflation. I have said that
it refuses to millions of taxpayers the basic simplification
that they deserve. These are tax criticisms of the bill: they
are deficiencies rather than positive faults. My fourth count
against the bill, particularly the Senate Finance Committee
version, is that it makes a dead letter of the provisions of
the "renegotiation" statute designed to prevent exorbitant
profits on war contracts.
When the Government began making contracts for war
supplies in 1940, the big question was how to hold down
profits. Everyone remembered the profiteering and inflation
of the last war. Then we had relied on the excess profits tax
to curb profits. We relied in vain. War business built many
fortunes. For twenty years after the 1918 Arrnistice the
country talked about taking the profit out of war. Perhaps
some of you recall the Republican and Democratic party plat-
form pledges of 1924. Both declared that in event of a war
19441
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in which citizens were drafted, all other resources should like-
wise be drafted. Yes, while public memory was still green,
we were solidly against lush war profits.
The law on renegotiation of war contracts was passed in
April, 1942. This new kind of war profit legislation was a
response to the Government and business criticism of rigid
profit limitations based on an allowable profit upon a low
and arbitrary percentage of sales. The law was made flexible
so that justice could be done in individual cases. Yet we hear
much criticism now that the renegotiation statute has no
standards. It can be made plain and rigid by recourse to
the old arbitrary limitation expedient. But the chief suf-
ferers would be the business men who complain of its vague-
ness.
The law directed the war procurement agencies, princi-
pally the War Department, Navy Department, and Maritime
Commission, to require renegotiotion of the contract price
whenever a contract yielded excessive profits. It also directed
them to eliminate inordinate profits by reductions in the
contract price.
The assignment was known to be hard. In fact, the task
of renegotiating with the tens of thousands of contractors
and subcontractors engaged in war production was gargan-
tuan. The departments organized for their work. They set
up Price Adjustment Boards. They recruited personnel large-
ly from business, law and accounting.
To date the total amount reclaimed from excessive prices
on war contracts by renegotiation is well over $5 billion. The
$5 billion does not represent net savings. Without renegotia-
tion, the greater part of this figure would have been collected
in excess profits taxes. Renegotiation, however, has saved at
least $14 billion that would not have been touched by taxes.
If the Price Adjustment Boards are not impeded in their
work, they will probably save the Government as much again
in the days to come.
I should like to tell you dramatically how the renegotia-
tion provisions of the pending Revenue Act are but an invita-
tion to repeat the mistakes of the First World War, are but
a preface to bitter charges of war profiteering. But good
drama, of necessity, distorts some of the facts. So I shall
sacrifice histrionics on the altar of accuracy.
The bill contains a provision permitting contractors to
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reopen in the courts all "closed" renegotiation cases, that is,
cases which have resulted in voluntary agreement between
the Government and the war contractor. There can be no
valid objection to a procedure which protects contractors in
their right to a fair determination of the facts and to ade-
quate judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies.
However, this principle can have no application to those cases
in which agreements have been reached. Attempts to make
it applicable to them fall wide of the mark. The adoption of
this provision will mean that over 8,000 cases, involving over
$5 billion of refunds and price reductions, may be reopened
and interminably litigated.
Another provision restricts the application of the Act
by making it apply only to contracts or subcontracts for "com-
ponents" of articles actually delivered to the Government
under prime contracts. It exempts from renegotiation a
large group of subcontractors who have admittedly made
excessive profits. To make matters worse, it is made retro-
active, requiring the Government to refund millions already
recovered from these companies.
A mandatory exemption for "standard commercial ar-
ticles" exempts the profits-however excessive they may be-
from the sale of such articles from renegotiation. The record
shows that exorbitant profits are being earned on a large scale
by concerns that produce standard commercial articles. As a
matter of fact, contractors making standard commercial ar-
ticles hold a more advantageous position than other war con-
tractors. Since they are making their peacetime products,
they have had and they will have fewer conversion problems.
Apart from the merits of this exemption, there will be in-
terminable debate as to what contracts are subject to the Act.
Still another provision requires the renegotiating agen-
cies to take estimated taxes into account for the purpose of
determining excessive profits. This is an anomaly in a
measure that is concerned with the establishment of sound
prices. It fundamentally changes the character of the rene-
gotiation process from a re-pricing procedure to a super ex-
cess-profits tax. It shifts the war contractor's war tax bur-
dens to the Government. More precisely, it transfers the
war contractor's war tax load from his own shoulders to those
of other taxpayers generally.
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Finally, the Senate Finance Committee bill contains a
provision requiring the renegotiating agencies to include as
a cost in the determination of excess profits carry-backs of
unused excess-profits credits and operating losses, as well as
amortization recomputations. This provision makes it im-
possible to conclude a renegotiation agreement within any
reasonable time. I do not believe the business man wants
to add this element of uncertainty to the many others that
beset him in those chaotic times.
It is no exaggeration to say that these amendments
emasculate the statute. Their adoption would make it worse
than nothing; it would leave a facade of war profit control
with no reality behind it. "Business Week," in its December
18, 1943, issue cited the Senate Finance Committee's "very
scientific demolition job" on the renegotiation law. "The
Committee," it said, "shrewdly avoided voting for outright
repeal, knowing Congress would find that hard to take in
an election year. Instead, it is trying to get the same result
by trimming down the scope of the act and by curtailing the
authority of the Price Adjustment Boards."
In this connection, I should like to commend to you the
minority report of the Senate Finance Committee. It elab-
orates on some of the points I have made and discusses in
detail and with great force the major defects in the bill rec-
ommended by the majority of the Committee.
Under the Committee amendments we should have re-
negotiation in name, but not in fact,-an unworkable, dis-
criminatory statute that makes many business men vulnerable
to the charge of war profiteering and recaptures only a small
amount of excessive war profits from one segment of indus-
try.
I doubt if the business men who have urged these changes
truly represent business. I am very sure that they are not
doing industry any service. I cannot believe that most busi-
ness men really desire extortionate war profits and a whirl-
wind of postwar scandal. Let me predict, with Secretary
Morgenthau, that if these provisions are enacted into law,
"they will come back to plague not only the Congress but
the war goods manufacturers who get temporary gain from
them." It is interesting to compare the Secretary's words
with a recent statement made by Mr. Charles E. Wilson,
executive vice-chairman of the War Production Board. Mr.
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Wilson said: "This above all is a time when the industrial
leaders of America owe it to their country and to themselves
... to avoid the temptation of sacrificing enduring values
for temporary gains.. "
CONCLUSION
In closing, I should like to stress that distinction between
transient gain and permanent value. The two are often in
contrast. The choice lies before us on the tax front and
renegotiation front. As the war moves on toward victory
we shall have to make many choices between these alterna-
tives. The immediate gain will be tempting. The lasting
value will seem ephemeral.
"Present joys are more to flesh and blood
Than a dull prospect of distant good."
My hope is that we will have the spirit, the imagination,
and the courage, to resist the pressures of apparent present
interests and to make our choices in terms of the enduring
interests of the future.
1944]

